Raipur: Security forces have begun one of the most extensive, coordinated anti‑Maoist operations in recent years across the Bastar region, aimed squarely at eliminating top CPI (Maoist) commander Mandvi Hidma and dismantling his Battalion Number 1 — the outlawed group’s most lethal and operationally capable fighting unit in south Bastar, officials said. The multi‑district offensive, focused on Sukma, Narayanpur and Bijapur, is being framed by authorities as a decisive push to dismantle the remaining leadership and core combat formations that sustain the insurgency.

Hidma, a native of Sukma, has been accused by security agencies of masterminding a string of major attacks on security forces over the past decade and a half. He led Battalion No. 1 for nearly ten years and was recently elevated to the post of secretary of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKZC), a powerful decision‑making body within the CPI (Maoist) hierarchy. The security establishment describes him as one of the last top‑rung operational commanders still active in south Bastar and blames him for several high‑casualty incidents, including the 2010 Dantewada massacre and subsequent ambushes that claimed dozens of lives.

Officials said the operation will target about 50 villages and forest camps that intelligence suggests remain sympathetic to or controlled by the Maoists, and where Hidma and other senior leaders are believed to be sheltering. “These are critical locations where the main leadership and cadre networks still operate,” an operation planner said. “The objective is to deny them sanctuary, disrupt their logistics and communications, and dismantle the command and control that allows them to plan attacks.”

The offensive is being mounted as a joint effort involving local and central forces — notably the District Reserve Guard (DRG), Bastar Fighters, the Special Task Force (STF) and units of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Ten specialised teams have reportedly been constituted to cover the operational zones. Authorities have cancelled leaves, reinforced forward posts and intensified intelligence‑gathering and aerial surveillance in the run‑up to the operation, the official added.

The timing of the operation dovetails with strong political directions from the centre. Union Home Minister Amit Shahhas set an ambitious deadline of March 2026 for clearing Bastar of Maoist presence, a target that has steepened focus on wrapping up large‑scale operations before the end of the current fiscal year. “All personnel have been placed on high alert and ordered to maintain operational readiness,” the official said, adding that the security apparatus is working to synchronise movements across districts to prevent any escape or intra‑district support for fugitives.

Authorities contend Battalion No. 1 remains the most dangerous active formation in the area. Security officials estimate the unit comprises at least 130 cadres, many of whom are reportedly well trained in guerrilla tactics, ambushes and improvised explosive device (IED) deployment. Battalion No. 1 is formally headed by Barse Devi, though agency sources say Hidma exercises decisive operational control. Members of this unit are believed to have been hand‑picked, indoctrinated and hardened through years of frontal insurgent activity, making them an especially hard target.

Recent months have seen a string of encounters and operations that, according to officials, have weakened the Maoist apparatus — including an intense engagement in the Karregutta Hills in April 2025 that lasted 21 days and reportedly resulted in 31 Maoist fatalities. Security sources say Hidma narrowly escaped during that encounter, which also sharpened resolve within security agencies to pursue him relentlessly. Those contacts, coupled with surrenders and intelligence from former cadres, have reportedly produced actionable leads on the movement and hideouts of Hidma and his lieutenants.

Inspector General of Police (Bastar Range) Sunderraj P underlined the security forces’ stated approach of combining pressure with an offer of surrender and rehabilitation. “Many former cadres have recognised the futility of violence and chosen to rejoin the mainstream,” he said, while stressing that a minority remain committed to violent acts that threaten civilians and security personnel. “We continue to appeal to the remaining Maoist elements — including those named by us such as Hidma, Pappa Rao and Barse Devi — to lay down arms, embrace the rule of law and participate in building a constructive future. Those who persist in violence will be dealt with firmly, in accordance with law.”

On the humanitarian and civic front, officials say the operation will seek to minimise collateral harm and prevent displacement or distress among local civilian populations. Commanders emphasise the need for careful cordons, targeted intelligence‑driven raids and strict adherence to rules of engagement to avoid civilian casualties. Local administrations are reportedly preparing contingency plans for relief, medical support and rehabilitation if villagers are displaced or caught up in clashes.

Security planners are also coordinating with development wings and civil authorities to amplify post‑operation measures — faster restoration of communications and transport links, stepped‑up delivery of welfare schemes, and intensified outreach to disenchanted communities. The official acknowledged that in many areas the Maoist presence has been sustained not only by coercion but also by local grievances over governance, land rights and development deficits; addressing these root causes remains a complementary pillar of the broader strategy to ensure long‑term peace and governance.

The stakes are high. If forces succeed in neutralising Hidma and disbanding Battalion No. 1, officials believe it would be a major psychological and operational blow to the CPI (Maoist) in the Dandakaranya belt and could accelerate surrenders, fractures and local disengagement from the insurgency. But security analysts caution that even a successful decapitation campaign will not alone eliminate the movement unless it is followed by sustained socio‑economic engagement and credible political‑administrative outreach.

The operation will likely test the integrated capabilities of local units backed by central forces, intelligence coordination and logistical sustainment in challenging forest terrain. Past large‑scale drives in Bastar have been prolonged and costly; this latest push, however, reflects sharpened tactical coordination and a clear political deadline that have combined to intensify pressure on the insurgency.

For now, security forces are in motion across Bastar’s dense forests and tribal hinterlands. Residents in targeted areas have reported increased troop movements, aerial sorties and the establishment of temporary camps. Officials stress that while the present phase is kinetic, equal emphasis will be placed on post‑operation stabilisation measures — an acknowledgment that defeating an insurgency requires both military pressure and a credible plan for durable peace.

As the campaign unfolds over the coming weeks, the central question will be whether the combined application of force, intelligence and governance can deliver a sustainable break in an insurgency that has endured for decades. For the security establishment, neutralising Mandvi Hidma and dismantling Battalion No. 1 would be a major step toward that objective; for local communities, it promises the possibility of reclaiming space for development and everyday life free from the shadow of violence.