The Delhi High Court on Friday upheld the legality of a prison rule that requires convicts to undergo a mandatory one-year “watch period” before they become eligible to apply for furlough after returning to prison following the dismissal of their appeals. The judgment, delivered by a division bench comprising Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, confirmed that the rule is valid, rational, and consistent with the framework of the Delhi Prisons Act and the Delhi Prisons Rules. It also dismissed a plea seeking to have the provision declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the fundamental rights of prisoners, particularly Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

The case arose from a petition filed by Deepak Srivastav, a convict serving a life sentence for dowry death and cruelty offences under the Indian Penal Code. Srivastav challenged a clause in a standing order issued in 2019 by the Director General of Prisons, which stipulates that convicts who return to jail after the dismissal of their appeals must complete a one-year period of observation before applying for furlough. When Srivastav’s appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court, he was re-admitted to prison, and his request for furlough was rejected on the grounds that he had not yet completed the watch period. The refusal prompted him to challenge both the standing order and its application to his case.

In his petition, Srivastav argued that the one-year waiting period is excessive, arbitrary, and discriminatory. He contended that the rule creates an unreasonable distinction between convicts who file appeals and those who choose not to contest their convictions. According to him, this distinction lacks any intelligible differentia and fails to meet constitutional standards of equality. He further claimed that the rule imposes undue hardship by delaying the consideration of furlough applications, thereby infringing on the basic rights of convicts to maintain family and social ties, which furlough is designed to protect. As an alternative, he requested that the court consider reducing the mandated period from one year to six months.

The High Court, however, rejected these arguments after examining the nature of the standing order and the purpose it seeks to serve. The bench underscored that the Director General of Prisons has the legal authority to issue such administrative directions, provided they do not conflict with statutory rules or the parent legislation. The court noted that the Delhi Prisons Act and the Delhi Prisons Rules do not specify a mandatory watch period but also do not prohibit the issuance of reasonable administrative guidelines intended to maintain order, discipline, and security within jails.

In its reasoning, the court highlighted the significant difference in circumstances between convicts who remain continuously imprisoned and those who spend extended periods outside jail while their appeals are pending. It observed that convicts released on bail or on suspension of sentence during the pendency of their appeals effectively spend substantial time reintegrated into society, away from the regimented discipline of prison life. Once such convicts return to custody after the dismissal of their appeals, the authorities reasonably expect them to need time to readjust to prison routines, systems, and behavioural expectations.

The bench emphasised that this adjustment period is not applicable to convicts who do not file appeals and remain continuously incarcerated. These individuals do not require reorientation because they never leave the prison environment. Therefore, the distinction between the two groups, the court said, is not merely rational but rooted in clear, observable differences in circumstance. For this reason, the petitioner’s argument that both categories of convicts form a single class was described as legally misconceived.

The court also held that the watch period serves a legitimate administrative purpose: allowing prison officials to monitor the behaviour, conduct, and adjustment of returning convicts before deciding on a furlough application. Furlough, unlike parole, is not a right but a conditional privilege granted based on good conduct, discipline, and the prison administration’s satisfaction regarding the prisoner’s suitability for temporary release. The bench reasoned that a one-year observation period is neither arbitrary nor excessive, particularly when weighed against the need for prison management to ensure that furlough is granted only to those whose conduct warrants it.

Srivastav had additionally argued that the rule lacked legal authority because it was implemented through a standing order rather than an amendment to the statutory rules. The court rejected this as well, clarifying that not all operational matters must be codified in statutory form. Administrative orders issued by the Director General in exercise of general supervisory powers remain valid as long as they do not override existing rules or infringe fundamental rights.

The High Court declined to entertain the request to shorten the period from one year to six months, noting that such a policy decision lies with the executive, not the judiciary. It further observed that the one-year period is not unreasonable on its face and that courts should be cautious about substituting administrative wisdom with judicial preferences unless a rule is shown to be unconstitutional or manifestly arbitrary.

While upholding the standing order, the court also addressed the petitioner’s immediate concern. It noted that Srivastav’s one-year watch period was due to expire on November 13. It therefore directed that if the petitioner submits a fresh request for furlough after completing the required period, the prison authorities must consider and decide the application promptly, in accordance with the law and without unnecessary delay.

The ruling is likely to have significant implications for prison administration in Delhi, as it reaffirms the authority of jail officials to implement structured, behaviour-based eligibility requirements for temporary release. It also strengthens the principle that furlough is a privilege contingent upon sustained good conduct and reintegration capacity, not merely a procedural formality available to all convicts at regular intervals.

The judgment serves as a reminder that while prisoners retain fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21, those rights operate within the special circumstances of incarceration, where discipline, security, and public safety remain paramount. By upholding the rule, the court has effectively endorsed a framework that prioritises careful screening and behavioural evaluation over automatic entitlement, reinforcing the careful balance between constitutional rights and administrative necessity in the criminal justice system.