The political landscape of Bihar has long been shaped by its distinctive demographic profile. With over 60% of its population belonging to the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs), the state has historically served as a nucleus of backward-class assertion, caste-based mobilisations, and targeted welfare schemes aimed at socially disadvantaged groups. This backdrop has defined much of Bihar’s electoral politics since the early 1990s, when the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations gave rise to a new era of backward caste empowerment. Yet, despite this entrenched reality, the 2025 assembly elections present a striking shift: major political parties—including those rooted in Mandal-era politics—are fielding an unusually large number of upper-caste candidates.

This change marks a significant reorientation in Bihar’s electoral strategy. For decades, upper castes—Brahmins, Rajputs, Bhumihars, and Kayasthas—held disproportionate political influence in the state. Their dominance waned after the Mandal movement, which elevated OBC leadership and made backward-class solidarity central to Bihar’s governance. Now, however, major parties on both sides of the political spectrum appear to be recalibrating their approach, suggesting that upper-caste groups, who constitute roughly 15% of the population, are being courted with renewed vigour.

Political analyst Prabhat Singh argues that this shift reflects a deeper continuity rather than an abrupt break. According to him, while Mandal politics reshaped Bihar’s political narrative, caste preferences were historically driven more by top-down party strategies than by organic grassroots demands. He notes that despite the resurgence of backward-class politics during Lalu Prasad Yadav’s tenure, Bihar’s earliest political leaders did not actively foreground caste. The current shift may therefore represent a cyclical return to a more multi-caste political calculation.

The clearest example of this recalibration is visible in the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) ticket distribution. Of the 101 seats allotted to the party under the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) seat-sharing arrangement, a remarkable 49 candidates come from upper-caste communities. This is one of the largest upper-caste shares in the party’s recent history. Rajputs account for the highest number of these nominations, with 21 candidates, followed by 16 Bhumihars, 11 Brahmins, and one Kayastha. The scale and clarity of this upper-caste tilt suggest a deliberate attempt to consolidate the BJP’s traditional support base at a time of heightened political competition, particularly from new challengers.

However, the NDA’s internal caste balance is maintained through its key ally, the Janata Dal (United), a party long associated with the support of EBCs, OBCs, and Dalits. Historically relying on backward-class social coalitions, the JD(U) has positioned itself as a counterweight to the BJP’s upper-caste-heavy approach. Yet even the JD(U) has shifted its stance in notable ways. Of the 101 seats it is contesting, the party has nominated 22 upper-caste candidates—around 21.78% of its total field. This marks a significant rise from the 2020 assembly elections, when upper-caste nominees made up just over 17% of its slate.

This strategic expansion signals an effort by the JD(U) to maximize its reach within the NDA and shore up support in constituencies where upper-caste voters wield substantial influence. The shift also reflects ongoing internal political dynamics. A prominent upper-caste figure within the party, Union minister and former JD(U) president Lalan Singh, has been actively involved in campaign efforts, particularly in constituencies such as Mokama. This region, tied historically to powerful upper-caste strongmen, remains symbolically important for the party as it seeks to preserve its political relevance amid fluctuating alliances. Singh’s involvement highlights how the party is now looking beyond its traditional EBC-OBC base to secure a broader coalition.

This trend is not limited to the NDA. The Mahagathbandhan, led by the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and the Congress, has also adjusted its ticket distribution in a direction that accommodates upper-caste voters. For the Congress, which is hoping to rebuild its presence in a state it last governed in the late 1980s, the nomination of 33 upper-caste candidates is a strategic choice. This includes 11 Bhumihars, nine Brahmins, nine Rajputs, and four Kayasthas. For a party attempting a political revival, especially among urban and semi-urban voters, appealing to the upper castes is viewed as essential.

The RJD’s decision to field 16 upper-caste candidates among its 142 nominees is even more notable, given the party’s longstanding identity as a champion of backward-caste politics. The RJD list remains overwhelmingly dominated by OBCs, with 75 candidates from these groups. Yet the incorporation of an increased upper-caste presence reflects a tactical shift toward a more balanced, socially inclusive candidate roster. This move aims not only to broaden the RJD’s electoral footprint, but also to neutralize criticism that it relies too heavily on its traditional Muslim-Yadav core.

A key factor influencing these shifts is the rise of Prashant Kishor and his political outfit, Jan Suraaj. Analysts such as NK Choudhary suggest that Kishor’s outreach and grassroots campaigns have made significant inroads among upper-caste and middle-class voters—a demographic that traditionally leaned toward the BJP. If Kishor succeeds in peeling away even a fraction of this support, established parties could face unexpected losses in key constituencies. To pre-empt this, both the NDA and Mahagathbandhan appear to be recalibrating their caste strategies.

Choudhary also observes that the RJD’s growing appeal among middle-class voters has unsettled the BJP and its allies, pushing them to amplify their upper-caste outreach. This interplay of competitive vote-base expansion—RJD seeking middle-class legitimacy, JD(U) seeking cross-caste relevance, BJP seeking caste consolidation—has made upper-caste representation a strategic necessity. As a result, nearly all major parties are attempting to ensure that their candidate lists reflect a level of caste inclusivity that would have been unthinkable during the earlier phases of Mandal-era politics.

The larger context further underscores this recalibration. Upper castes, though only around 15% of the population, remain numerically influential in several constituencies and maintain strong social networks and organisational strength. Paired with the state’s substantial Muslim population at around 16.9% and Dalit communities comprising another 16%, Bihar’s electorate is deeply segmented, with no single group holding dominance across all regions. This fragmented demography forces political parties to carefully assemble caste coalitions that can win at the constituency level, even when statewide numbers may seem unfavourable.

In essence, the 2025 Bihar elections illustrate a renewed pragmatism in caste politics. Parties that once appeared firmly aligned with backward-class narratives are now broadening their appeal, while parties traditionally supported by upper castes are doubling down to secure that vote bank. The interplay of historical patterns, emerging political threats, and the fluidity of caste coalitions has produced an electoral field where the upper castes, once considered politically sidelined, have re-emerged as key stakeholders. This shift does not signal the end of Mandal politics, but rather its evolution—one where caste equations continue to shape electoral strategies, even as parties strive for more flexible and inclusive political identities.