New Delhi, December 11, 2025 — The Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) has submitted a damning report on the Chhattisgarh train collision that occurred on November 4, 2025, holding the rail administration responsible for deploying an unfit loco pilot (LP) who had failed the mandatory aptitude test. The rear-end collision between a local MEMU passenger train and a goods train in the Bilaspur division claimed 12 lives, including that of the loco pilot, and left 19 passengers injured.

The CRS report, recently submitted to the Railway Board, paints a picture of systemic negligence and procedural lapses that contributed to the accident, underscoring critical shortcomings in personnel deployment and operational oversight.

Background of the Incident

On November 4, 2025, a local MEMU train (No. 68733) operating in the Bilaspur division of Chhattisgarh collided with a goods train, resulting in a catastrophic rear-end collision. Eyewitness accounts and subsequent investigations indicated that the passenger train was under the control of a loco pilot who lacked the requisite skills to handle the train independently.

The CRS investigation reveals that the deployed loco pilot had failed the mandatory aptitude test, which is a precondition for handling single-motorman trains such as MEMUs. Despite this, the rail administration allowed him to operate the train, raising serious concerns about adherence to safety protocols.

CRS Findings on the Loco Pilot

According to CRS Brijesh Kumar Mishra, South Eastern Circle, Kolkata, the LP in question appeared for the aptitude test on June 9, 2025, but failed. The report highlighted several alarming observations regarding the LP’s conduct and competence:

1. Inadequate Knowledge and Reliance on Phone Calls:
   The CRS noted that the LP frequently contacted the Chief Loco Inspector (CLI) during the train run for guidance on routine operational issues, including resetting the Automatic Control Panel (ACP) and releasing the parking brake while the train was stationary at stations GTW and GAD. Such telephonic consultation during train operation is considered highly unsafe and indicative of a lack of preparedness and knowledge.
2. Failure to Demonstrate Competency:
   The CRS found that the LP lacked the required qualities for MEMU operation, including familiarity with rules, timely decision-making, and adequate reaction time. Even the Assistant Loco Pilot (ALP) accompanying him had expressed concerns about his capability.
3. Deficiencies in Certification:
   The CRS pointed out irregularities in the Certificate of Competency issued to the LP by the senior divisional electrical engineer of Bilaspur Division. Mishra noted that proper procedures were not followed during the certification process, raising questions about the validity of the LP’s authorization to operate MEMU trains.
4. Single-Motorman Protocol Violations:
   MEMU trains are classified as single-man working trains, and Railway Board norms explicitly require passing the aptitude test for loco pilots assigned to such operations. Despite the LP failing the test, officials argued that deployment with an ALP was permissible, similar to normal coaching trains. The CRS deemed this argument unacceptable, emphasizing that Railway Board regulations strictly prohibit assigning unfit LPs to MEMU trains, regardless of whether an ALP is present.
5. Manpower Shortages and Systemic Gaps:
   The CRS highlighted a shortfall in trained personnel: of the 142 LPs required for MEMU operations in the South Eastern Central Railway (SECR) zone, only 102 had cleared the mandatory aptitude test, leaving a deficit of 40 qualified LPs. This manpower gap contributed to the deployment of unfit personnel and increased operational risks.

Calls for Systemic Improvements

In addition to faulting the railway administration for personnel mismanagement, the CRS made several recommendations aimed at improving safety and preventing similar accidents in the future:

1. Advanced Auxiliary Warning System (AAWS):
   The CRS recommended implementing the Advanced Auxiliary Warning System, which monitors train speed relative to signal aspects and automatically applies brakes if signals are violated. This system has been successfully implemented in EMU rakes in Mumbai suburban sections and could be adapted for MEMU operations in other territories with automatic signaling.
2. Ensuring Competency-Based Deployment:
   Mishra stressed that LPs should only be deployed on MEMU trains after passing the aptitude test, and additional manpower should be arranged by the Railway Board to cover shortfalls in qualified personnel.
3. Reinforcing Standard Operating Procedures:
   The CRS urged railway authorities to reinforce training and operational protocols. For example, ALPs should maintain one hand on the RS valve when passing signals showing a “one yellow” aspect to enable immediate emergency braking if required.
4. Mandatory Assistant Loco Pilots:
   According to Railway Board instructions, MEMU trains covering distances exceeding 200 km should operate with an ALP regardless of the motorman’s competency. The CRS noted that train No. 68733 should have had an ALP deployed alongside the LP.
5. Counseling and Monitoring:
   The CRS recommended regular counseling of ALPs and LPs regarding adherence to safety norms, operational protocols, and emergency handling procedures. This measure is intended to enhance situational awareness and decision-making under pressure.

Systemic Lapses and Accountability

The CRS report highlights a broader pattern of systemic lapses in the SECR zone and possibly other railway divisions:

• Deployment of underqualified personnel in critical operations due to staff shortages.
• Certification and competency evaluation processes that are inadequately monitored or circumvented.
• Inadequate safety oversight and failure to enforce single-motorman regulations.
• Reliance on ad hoc guidance and telephonic consultation during active train operations, compromising passenger safety.

By identifying these gaps, the CRS report places responsibility squarely on railway administration officials who failed to comply with mandatory procedures and safety norms.

Implications for Railway Operations

The CRS findings carry significant implications for rail safety and operational protocols nationwide:

• Ensuring that all LPs pass aptitude tests before deployment on MEMU and other single-motorman trains becomes critical.
• Expanding infrastructure for emergency braking systems such as AAWS could prevent collisions in automatic signaling areas.
• Addressing manpower shortages in key railway divisions is necessary to avoid compromising safety standards.
• Strengthening training and monitoring for both LPs and ALPs can reduce human error, which remains a leading cause of train accidents.

Conclusion

The Chhattisgarh train collision on November 4, 2025, stands as a tragic reminder of the dangers of deploying unfit personnel and the consequences of systemic lapses in railway administration. The CRS report underscores that the LP’s failure to pass the aptitude test, combined with telephonic reliance on superiors during routine operations, directly contributed to the accident.

As the Railway Board considers the CRS recommendations, authorities face urgent decisions regarding personnel deployment, implementation of automated safety systems, and filling the manpower gap in MEMU operations. Strengthening oversight, adherence to norms, and safety-focused training will be crucial to preventing similar incidents in the future and restoring public confidence in India’s rail network.

The CRS report not only assigns accountability for the immediate collision but also serves as a blueprint for reforming railway safety procedures and ensuring that tragedies caused by operational negligence do not recur.