The Supreme Court on Thursday rejected a petition filed by Allahabad High Court judge Justice Yashwant Varma, holding that “constitutional safeguards for judges cannot come at the cost of paralysing the removal process itself.” The judgment effectively clears the decks for the three-member inquiry committee constituted by the Lok Sabha Speakerunder the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, allowing proceedings into the judge’s alleged misconduct to move forward.

Justice Varma had challenged the Speaker’s decision to initiate impeachment proceedings against him following reports of unaccounted cash found at his official residence in Delhi in March 2025. At the time, he was serving as a judge of the Delhi High Court. A subsequent in-house inquiry by the Supreme Court found his explanation unsatisfactory, prompting then Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna to recommend action to the Prime Minister and President.

Notices seeking Justice Varma’s removal were moved in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on July 21, 2025. While the Lok Sabha Speaker admitted the motion on August 12 and constituted a three-member inquiry committee, the Rajya Sabha deputy chairman, following the resignation of then Vice President and Chairman Jagdeep Dhankar, declined to admit the motion in the Upper House, citing procedural defects.

The committee formed by the Lok Sabha Speaker comprises Supreme Court Justice Aravind Kumar, Madras High Court Chief Justice Manindra Mohan Srivastava, and senior advocate BV Acharya.

At the heart of Justice Varma’s legal challenge was the interpretation of the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, which he argued required the constitution of a joint committee whenever removal motions were moved in both Houses on the same day. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this interpretation, holding that the proviso applies only in “specific and limited situations” where motions are admitted in both Houses. Accepting Varma’s reading, the court warned, would amount to judicial legislation and could render one House’s autonomy contingent on the other, producing “absurd results.”

The bench, comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, noted that the protection of judgesremains intact. Even after the inquiry report is submitted, both Houses retain the constitutional authority to accept or reject the motion by the special majority mandated under Article 124(4). The court emphasized that judicial safeguards cannot be allowed to paralyse the removal process, and the proviso must be interpreted to balance judicial protection with the functioning of the parliamentary mechanism for removal.

Justice Varma had also challenged the authority of the Rajya Sabha deputy chairman to refuse admission of the motion during the vacancy in the chairman’s office. The Supreme Court upheld the deputy chairman’s authority, noting that constitutional principles allow a vacancy to be filled by the next competent office-holder and that such a vacancy cannot halt parliamentary functioning.

The court underscored that members of the Lok Sabha who moved the motion were exercising their constitutional responsibility, and upon the valid admission of the motion by the Speaker, they acquired the statutory entitlement to have the matter examined by the inquiry committee. Nullifying this right based on procedural infirmities in the other House, the bench said, would curtail the participatory rights of elected representatives without statutory warrant.

In terms of procedural safeguards, the court highlighted that the Judges (Inquiry) Act itself provides elaborate mechanisms for due process, including framing of charges, opportunity for defense, cross-examination of witnesses, and adjudication by senior constitutional functionaries. These provisions ensure that a judge’s rights are preserved throughout the inquiry.

The Supreme Court also flagged concerns about the role of the Rajya Sabha secretariat, which had declared the notice of motion “not in order.” Parliamentary records submitted to the court revealed that Rajya Sabha Secretary General PC Mody had, in an opinion dated August 11, 2025, flagged multiple legal, procedural, and factual infirmities, citing incorrect invocation of statutory provisions, unauthenticated supporting material, and factual inconsistencies. Acting on this, Deputy Chairman Harivansh formally declined to admit the motion.

The court, however, disagreed with Mody’s approach. It observed that the secretariat had gone beyond its administrative remit and assumed a quasi-adjudicatory role, whereas its function was limited to placing the notice before the competent authority. “A notice could not reasonably be treated as ineffective solely on account of perceived deficiencies in drafting or form,” the judgment noted. The bench clarified that these observations were academic and did not affect the validity of the deputy chairman’s decision. It also expressed hope that in future cases, the secretariat would exercise restraint and leave admissibility decisions to the Speaker or Chairman.

Finally, the Supreme Court held that Justice Varma was not entitled to relief under Article 32, noting that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court is confined to the enforcement of fundamental rights. The court observed that internal parliamentary mechanisms, where no present or inevitable violation of rights is shown, are outside the scope of Article 32 remedies.

With this ruling, the three-member inquiry committee can now proceed with the investigation into Justice Varma’s alleged misconduct. The judgment reinforces the principle that constitutional protections for judges must coexist with accountability mechanisms and underscores the autonomy and functioning of parliamentary processes in judge removal proceedings.