As 2025 comes to a close, India’s foreign policy landscape appears more complex, volatile, and uncertain than it has been in years. The familiar anchors of diplomacy—long-term partnerships, stable neighbourhoods, and predictable great-power equations—were repeatedly tested by war, political upheaval, and shifting global alignments. From a brief but intense military conflict with Pakistan to a sharp downturn in ties with the United States under President Donald Trump’s second term, and turmoil in neighbouring Bangladesh and Nepal, the year underscored one defining reality: the world around India has become far less predictable.

A Strategic Shock to India–US Relations

Few developments captured this uncertainty as starkly as the rapid deterioration of India–US relations. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Washington in February, soon after Trump’s inauguration for a second term, optimism was high. The two leaders agreed on a roadmap for cooperation in trade, defence, and strategic technologies, reinforcing a partnership that had been steadily built over the past two decades.

That optimism proved short-lived. Within months, the relationship slid into what many analysts described as its lowest point since the Cold War. Trump’s repeated public claims that he had personally brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan after their May conflict were deeply resented in New Delhi, which firmly denied any third-party mediation. Compounding the strain was Washington’s growing proximity to Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and the imposition of steep tariffs on Indian exports.

The US administration slapped a 50% tariff on Indian goods, including a 25% penalty explicitly linked to India’s purchases of Russian oil. The move injected a sharp trust deficit into the relationship, eroding years of strategic goodwill. While negotiations continued on what was intended to be the first tranche of a bilateral trade deal—originally slated for conclusion by autumn—American demands in politically sensitive sectors such as agriculture and dairy left most observers sceptical.

Trade experts argued that the impasse could not be resolved by negotiators alone. “If the US is serious about partnership, it should first cut the punitive tariff on Indian exports,” said Ajay Srivastava of the Global Trade Research Initiative. He warned New Delhi against making concessions on agriculture or genetically modified products, stressing that balance, not optics, must guide India’s approach.

Russia, Oil, and Strategic Balancing

Overlaying the India–US tension was the persistent challenge of managing ties with Russia. India’s continued purchases of Russian oil and military hardware drew increasing pressure from Washington, particularly as Trump grew frustrated with the lack of progress in ending the Russia–Ukraine war.

By the end of 2025, India had begun reducing its energy imports from Russia, which had emerged as a top supplier over the past three years, and increased purchases of American energy. Yet there were no signs of the US easing its punitive tariffs, reinforcing perceptions in New Delhi that concessions were not being reciprocated.

In this context, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India toward the end of the year took on added significance. The annual summit focused on strengthening economic ties through a five-year plan to address trade imbalances and a mobility pact for Indian workers. Former diplomat Rajiv Bhatia described the visit as a “corrective measure” that helped create diplomatic space at a time when the downturn in India–US relations appeared deeper and longer-lasting than expected.

Conflict with Pakistan and China’s Shadow

Security challenges further complicated India’s external environment. The April terror attack in Pahalgam by The Resistance Front, a proxy of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, triggered a sharp escalation with Pakistan. India’s precision strikes on terrorist infrastructure were followed by four days of drone, missile, and long-range weapon exchanges between the two sides.

Though military commanders eventually reached an understanding to halt hostilities, the situation remains fragile. Officials acknowledge that another major terror attack could easily trigger renewed conflict. The clashes also highlighted China’s role as a strategic backer of Pakistan, reinforcing concerns in New Delhi about the evolving China–Pakistan axis.

At the same time, India continued its cautious effort to stabilise relations with China after a four-year military standoff along the Line of Actual Control. Some confidence-building measures were revived in 2025: the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and direct flights resumed after five years, and India eased visa norms for Chinese tourists and business travellers. Yet the fundamentals remained unchanged, with around 50,000 troops from each side still deployed in the Ladakh sector. China’s restrictions on exports of heavy machinery, fertilisers, and critical minerals added another layer of economic vulnerability to the relationship.

Multilateral Strains and the Quad Question

Despite bilateral tensions, India and the US continued cooperation in select strategic areas. The joint launch of the NISAR satellite by NASA and ISRO, ongoing military exercises, and the signing of a 10-year defence framework agreement all pointed to enduring institutional ties.

However, the broader unravelling of relations cast a shadow over multilateral groupings such as the Quad. India is due to host the Quad’s annual summit, but no date has been finalised, largely because it would require a visit by Trump. The uncertainty has raised questions about the future momentum of the grouping at a time when Indo-Pacific stability remains a shared concern.

Neighbourhood Turmoil: Nepal and Bangladesh

If great-power politics posed one set of challenges, India’s immediate neighbourhood presented another. In September, Nepal witnessed a dramatic upheaval when a Gen Z-led protest movement toppled the government of KP Sharma Oli. The protests reflected deep frustration among young Nepalis over corruption and poor governance, catching New Delhi off guard and injecting uncertainty into bilateral ties.

Even more troubling was the situation in Bangladesh. Toward the end of the year, the assassination of radical student leader Sharif Osman Hadi—an outspoken critic of what he termed “India’s hegemony”—sparked nationwide unrest. Protests quickly took on anti-India overtones, with mobs attempting to target Indian missions.

Former high commissioner Deb Mukherjee described the situation as a serious governance failure, warning that the resulting anarchy served no one’s interests. While elections are scheduled for February, along with a referendum on constitutional changes, doubts remain about whether they can be conducted peacefully or restore stability. Analysts fear that even a new elected government could be hamstrung by emboldened student groups and radical forces wielding street power.

Looking Ahead to 2026

Taken together, 2025 painted a picture of a world in flux—where alliances are less certain, neighbourhoods more volatile, and global rules more contested. India found itself navigating a crowded and turbulent diplomatic agenda, balancing competing pressures while trying to preserve strategic autonomy.

As the country looks to 2026, the lessons of the past year are sobering. Partnerships can fray quickly, neighbourhood stability cannot be taken for granted, and global power politics are increasingly shaped by unpredictability. For Indian diplomacy, the challenge ahead will be not just managing crises, but building resilience in a world where certainty is increasingly scarce.